Inter-Asia Research Networksdetail, as a combination of religious and political.In the first place, as I. W. Mabbett (1978) has said, “it is clear that Angkor cannot be treated as a static entity, unchanging from start to finish.” He goes on to say that “P. Stern discerns an interesting rhythm in the pattern of activity of certain kings who had the motive, the means, and the time to fulfil their destiny as they saw it: first the construction of major works for the public good, especially reservoirs; then the building of ancestral temples; finally, as the crowning demonstration of imperium, the erection of the symbolic temple mountains which notionally were the centre of the kingdom, the abode of divinity and royal power.” However, this pattern of aspiration of kings is no more than only one aspect of kingship or state integration of Angkor. Indeed, there were only four kings who accomplished this: Indravarman I (reigned 877–889CE), Yas´ovarman I (889–910?), RΣjendravarman II (944–968), and Jayavarman VII (1181–1218?). If we rely only on this viewpoint, we would have to evaluate the other kings of Angkor as inadequate; moreover, whether or not we can assume a consistent policy throughout the history of Angkor is still open to discussion. Relevant to this point is H. Kulke (1986; 2001)’s following remark: “the process of state for-mation usually passed through three successive phases, namely, the local, regional, and imperial phases or levels...the numerous Early Kingdoms with their precarious balance of power, shared by the central authority of a primus inter pares and the centrifugal local polities, were certainly the dominant feature of the political map of Southeast Asia throughout the first millennium A.D. At the end of this period, however, a new development began which changed this political map considerably during the first centuries of the second millennium.” This passage is in accordance with Mabbett’s observation, which was quoted above, as “royal power depended in a sense on the personal loyalty of the king’s following; this in turn depended upon the nature and the strength of the ties between sovereign and clients... In later reigns, the descendants of these clients owe less and less to the monarch, and have their own hereditary and landed sources of authority and power. Centrifugal tendencies become stronger; factions become more violently opposed; finally a candidate for the throne appears who is able, and considers it necessary, to remove from influence all factions but his own.”These remarks show the parallel sequences in the political history of Angkor such as centralization and the rise and challenge of regional elites. Many scholars have closely studied the important innovation in the reign of Sπryavarman I (1002–1050), in the germinal change of the divinity of king (devarΣja cult), distribution of functions, and integration of the territory in the later Angkor period took place. The concept of kingship, so-called “devarΣja (god-king),” although this term was often overemphasized, shows at least that the personality cult was one of the bases of Angkor authoritarianism. However, personality cults were not exclusive to kings; regional elites also claimed divinity for themselves and their families. Kingship in Angkor can be therefore traced in various efforts aimed at achieving higher divinity by kings and their entourage in the fluid social situation in Angkor.BibliographyBriggs, Lawrence Palmer. 1952. “The Genealogy and Successors of SivΣcΣrya,” Bulletin de l’École Française d’Extrême-Orient, 46-1, pp. 177–185.Cœdès, George. 1937–1966. Inscriptions du cambodge, I–VIII, Hanoi-Paris.̶. 1964. Les états hindouisés d’Indochine et d’Indonésie, New ed., Paris.̶. 1970. “Le véritable fondateur du culte de la royauté divine au Cambodge,” Himansu Bhusan Sarkar (ed.), R. C. Ma-jumdar Felicitation Volume, Mestier du Bourg, Hubert. 1970. “La première moitie du XIe siècle au Cambodge,” Journal Asiatique, 258(3-4), pp. 281–314.087