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issue of the resolution of the “freebooter-style conditions” plaguing East Asia. As Hideyoshi himself claimed, his Cessation of Piracy Ordinance was significant in this situation; however, its meaning changes drastically according to how it is placed within the context of subjective intent, or military strategy. For Hideyoshi, it was for all intents and purposes merely a pretext of the invasion of the Continent. Therefore, between the restoration of maritime security and the direction taken in the invasion of the Continent existed a wide gap in the perception of reality in East Asia at the time.The first problem was a lack of international consciousness. This lack is exemplified best by Hideyoshi’s diplomatic relations with Korea through the SΩ Clan. Despite Hideyoshi’s mistaken impression about the relationship between the SΩs and the Korean Court, his demanding that Korea pay tribute to Japan while the former was already under the suzerainty of Ming China was out of the question. To resolve this situation, the SΩs dispatched a faux embassy of the “king of Japan,” and deflected Hideyoshi’s demand into a request to send a delegation to celebrate the enthronement of the “new king.” Because the Korean Court had demanded as a condition that the freebooters (wakΩ) who had ravaged their country be extradited, the SΩs handed over to them criminals and prisoners of war and finally got Korea to send a delegation. Although Konishi Yukinaga 小西行長, the Toyotomi regime’s naval functionary, was involved in the arrest of the freebooters, there is strong evidence that Hideyoshi was not informed of the fact that the perpetrators were extradited to Korea [Yonetani 2003]. It was in this way that a Korean delegation finally arrived in Kyoto during the 7th month of TenshΩ 18 (1590), and Hideyoshi, who had just returned from a punitive expedition to the northern part of Japan’s mainland (∂shπ 奥州), was misinformed that it was a tributary mission. It was not until the 11th month that he got around to granting the Korean delegates an audience, and when he for some unknown reason became convinced that the delegation was a tributary mission, he wrote a response ordering them to collaborate in the invasion of the Continent. The ambassador protested, but to no avail. After the mission’s return to Korea, monk/diplomat Keitetsu Genso 景轍玄蘇, representing the opinion of the SΩs, conducted further negotiations with Korea by attempting to spin the demand to lead the invasion of the Continent (Seimin kyΩdΩ 征明嚮導) into a request for Korea to provide reconnaissance and logistics assistance in the invasion and conquest of China (Kato nyπmin 仮途入明) [Kitajima 1982], but had no hope of succeeding. Despite the fact that the SΩ Clan and the monk/diplomats were fully knowledgeable of the actual international situation in East Asia, SaishΩ JΩtai’s reluctance to speak the truth to power went as far as penning a personal appeal to Hideyoshi, assuring him that “punishing a fledgling kingdom like the Ming Dynasty should be no more difficult than a mountain crushing an egg” [MΩrike Monjo; Kitajima 1982].IV. The Failure of the Invasion 1. From Occupation Planning to Peace ConditionsAs the invasion of the Continent got underway, Japan’s departure from the reality of international relations grew more and more remote. In the mid-4th month of TenshΩ 12/Bunroku 文禄 1 (1592), the first battalions under SΩ Yoshitoshi 宗義智 and Konishi Yukinaga landed on the Korean Peninsula at Busan 山; and after one more request for logistic support to infiltrate China and one more denial, the Japanese forces laid siege to Busan Castle and captured it in a matter of two hours. Due in part to a slow response from the Korean side, Japanese made their way to the capital of Hanseong 漢城 (present day Seoul) and captured it early the following month. As soon as he received the news of the victories, Hideyoshi made public his plans for the occupation and rule of East Asia, 010MODERN ASIAN STUDIES REVIEW Vol.8

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