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imposing harsh restrictions on trading partners would be merely begging the question. Something more is needed as this point in the research.The pioneering postwar political historian Ishimoda ShΩ 石母田正, who was one of the first historians of ancient and medieval Japan to stress the importance of international developments in the process of state formation, was quick to add that “conquest and war are effective in promoting the formation of the state only in the case where the internal class relations among the peoples involved have reached a specific stage of development” [Ishimoda 1989]. Whereas such a proviso is critical of any absolute argument that conquest and war constitute the foundation of state formation and seems to emphasize the need for taking notice of critical internal social moments, in elucidating the problem at hand, it points out the importance of tracing Japan’s Warring States and Oda-Toyotomi regime eras. In particular, concerning Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea, rather than being a response to rising international tension, it is important to note that this action was put into motion due to social developments internal to Japan, and itself was the cause of growing tension throughout East Asia. What is needed here, as also pointed out by Ishimoda, is a clarification of “the interrelationship and inseparability of one moment in international relations being transformed into the internal politics of one nation, or vice versa” [Ishimoda 1971]. Therefore, while keeping in mind similarity in what was happening throughout East Asia at the time, we must also take account of the unique character of historical development within Japan.There are a number of studies that have focused on this point. For example, in the work of Miki SeiichirΩ 三鬼清一郎, we see an attempt to clarify the way in which military obligation under the kokudaka 石高 tax allocation system was organized through mobilization for the invasion of Korea, concluding that the historical importance of the invasion cannot be found “without shedding light on the way in which national unification was accompanied by preparations for troop deployment to Korea and tying together the concepts underlying Hideyoshi’s land cadasters and the logic behind the invasion of Korea” [Miki 1974]. Incidentally, it was Miki who also discussed the Toyotomi regime’s failure to impose the kokudaka system in the captured territory of Korea [ibid.]. Then there is the work of Fujiki Hisashi 藤木久志 on “Hideyoshi’s Pacification Directives,” in which Fujiki tried to “discover the characteristic features of the Toyotomi regime’s invasion of Korea as part of the comprehensive series of domestic unification policies that were hatched and coercively implemented.” That is to say, Hideyoshi’s order for Korea to submit was merely an extension of SΩbujirei 惣無事令 (Universal Cessation of Hostilities Directive), which outlawed military action to settle territorial disputes and ordered compliance with settlements of those disputes issued by the Toyotomi regime, in that the invasion was perceived as a “punitive action” against those who had disregarded the Directive. Fujiki concludes that “there was probably no perception of foreign invasion for a Japanese side that was intent on expanding the scope of one of its national unification policies; and as to its defeat and troop withdrawal, rather than a sense of having lost a war, there was instead the exhilaration of having crossed the sea to duly punish the offenders” [Fujiki 1985]. While such analysis of the intentions of the Toyotomi regime evaluates its invasion of Korea at an extension of domestic politics, what is also important in this respect is the reason behind the regime’s implementation of policies completely insensitive to national and ethnic differences and to what extent such chauvinistic insensitivity influenced the formation of the state in late premodern Japan. 004MODERN ASIAN STUDIES REVIEW Vol.8

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